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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE

STATUS

OF

THE

RIGHT

TO

PICKET

IN

WASHINGTON-

The recent decision of the Washington Supreme Court in the
case of Sterling Chain Theatres, Incorporated, v. Central Labor
Council of Seattle, et al.,' as to the right to picket, constitutes such
a radical departure from the heretofore well-established law of
this state, that a retrospection and analysis is essential to a better
understanding as to the future solution of this question. In the
instant case, the plaintiff sought to restrain as unlawful the acts
of members of defendant union of maintaining peaceful patrols
marching to and fro with placards signed by the council of all the
unions, informing the public that a strike was in progress and to
"Stay Out."
Such men approached no closer than 100 feet to
the entrance of the theatre, and were out of the sight of such
entrance most of the time. The trial court did not decide upon
the limitations of defendants' activities, but rested its decree solely
on the finding that Danz v. American Federation of Musicians'
Union- was res adjudicata to this action. The Supreme Court in
affirming the decision of the trial court held such acts are lawful
and do not constitute picketing, when the pickets approach no closer
than 100 feet, and are out of sight of the entrances most of the
time. "But each case must turn on its own circumstances, and the
limitations placed by the trial court on the activities of the respon'55 Wash. Dec. 147, 283 Pac. 1047 (1930)
2133 Wash. 186, 233 Pac. 630 (1925).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
dents and their agents are, under the circumstances of this case and
for whatever reason adopted by the trial court, reasonable." '
Without doubt there is a sharp conflict of authority as to what
constitutes picketing, some courts holding that picketing is unlawful only when it leads to physical intimidation, other jurisdictions
declare that only peaceful picketing is permissible, while others,
including Washington (with the exception of the instant case and
the Adams4 and Danz6 cases which apply the 100-foot rule) will
not permit picketing under any circumstances. The reason for the
latter rule is that picketing in and of itself constitutes intimidation
to the mind and the body
The development of the law as to picketing in Washington is
very interesting to :observe. In 1905, all picketing was declared
unlawful in Washington. 6 In 1915, the Washington Legislature
defined picketing and placed a restriction of 500 feet on such
activities.7 But this was defeated in 1916 on referendum. In 1917,
in the St. Germam case,8 the Supreme Court of this state unequivocally reaffirmed the rule that all picketing is unlawful. This
same view was reiterated in 1918.' In 1919, the Legislature
enacted the Union Act, most of which with an important exception, was taken bodily from the Clayton Act, which authorized
peaceful picketing. 10 With the language of the Jensen and St. Germain cases before it, which held that any form of picketing was
unlawful, the Legislature expressly omitted the peaceful picketing
clause of the Federal Clayton Act," and thus committed itself
definitely to the view that all picketing is unlawful. In 1922, the
court expressed the view that peaceful picketing as authorized
under the Clayton Act would be recognized in this jurisdiction as
indicated in the Pacific Coast Coal Company v. Dustrict No. 10,
United Mine Workers of Amertca, et al."2 In 1923, in Adams et al.
v. Local No. 400 of Cooks and Waiters and Waitresses of Spokane
et al.,13 the Washington Court for the first time adopted the 100foot rule, in which it declared that picketing within 100 feet was
unlawful, but permitted picketing beyond that limit. By this
decision the court apparently demed its former position that all
picketing was illegal. An exhaustive research discloses no reason
for the adoption of the 100-foot rule. The acts complained of in
the Adams case were all committed within a short distance from
See note 1, supra.

'See note 13, infra.
See note 14, infra.

'Jensen v. Cooks' and Waiters Unon, 39 Wash. 531, 81 Pac. 1069, 4 L.
R. A. (n.s.) 302 (1905).
'Laws of Wash. 1915, ch. 181.
8St. Gervian v. Bakery d Confect. W Union, No. 9, 97 Wash. 282, 166
Pac. 665, L. R. A. 1917F 824 (1917).
'Baasc v. Cooks' Unton, Local 33, 99 Wash. 378, 169 Pac. 843 (1918).
"Laws of Wash. 1919, ch. 185.
38 Stat. at L. Part I, 1914, see 6, 20.
122 Wash. 423, 210 Pac. 953 (1922).
2124 Wash. 64, 215 Pac. 19 (1923).
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the places of business, and it may be concluded that restricting the
acts of picketing outside of 100 feet was thought to be sufficient
at that time. The Adams opinion holds "that this does not mean
that the limit fixed in this case shall of itself be a standard in any
future case where such a plan is adopted for 'each case must turn
on its own circumstances' "
In 1925, in the decision of Danz v. American Federationof Musicians, et aI., 1 the court apparently reaffirms the doctrine that all
picketing is unlawful in these terms
"Support for this view (that picketing is unlawful only
when coercive) may be found in the decisions of some
courts, but this court has committed itself to a doctrine
different than contended for by the respondents and has
declared all picketing unlawful, announcing that the term
sometimes used of 'peaceful picketing' is self-contradictory
and meaningless, that picketing, in and of itself, is coercive
and that that is its purpose and effect."
It is unfortunate that the question as to whether picketing would
be allowed within 100 feet was not directly raised on the appeal of
the Danz case, but it was not. The lower court enjoined the defendants, among other things, from carrying and displaying in front
of the theatres or within 100 feet thereof, badges bearing the inscription that the theatres and owners were unfair to organized
labor. But the lower court permitted observers to be stationed
near the entrance to the theatres wearing a sash informing the
public that a strike against the theatre was iij progress. A general
appeal was taken, but no question was raised as to what distance
picketing could be maintained, the plaintiff contending that all
picketing was unlawful, and the argument was directed against
the permitting of the observers to be stationed in front of the
theatre. The Supreme Court was asked to eliminate from the
decree such provisions, which it did, and affirmed the decree as
so modified. Therefore, there is room for the argument that the
court approved picketing outside of the 100-foot limit, although
in the opinion of the case, it expressly held that picketing in and of
itself is unlawful. It seems from the language of the court that
it would have denied picketing within a distance greater tnan 100
feet had that extension been asked. It is, therefore, unfortunate
that the Adams case was not called to the -attention of the court,
for due to the strong language in the Danz case declaring all picketing to be unlawful, it seems that the Adams case would have been
expressly overruled, especially in view of the fact that the Adams
case was apparently based on a federal
case which recognized peace15
ful picketing under the Clayton Act.
"1 133

Wash. 186, 233 Pac. 630 (1925)

Trn-City Central Trades Council v. Am. Steel Foundries, 151 C. C. A.

578 (1916) modified in 257 U. S. 184, 66 L. Ed. 189, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72, 27
A. L. R. 360 (1921)

NOTES A.D COMMENTS
No further decision was rendered until the instant case was
decided January 10, 1930. The court based its decision on the
fact that the so-called patrols were out of the sight of the theatre
entrances most of the time and were not closer than 100 feet. The
court adroitly evaded the question through a matter of definition
by holding that the acts complained of were not "picketing," but
were the mere "dissemination of information," which is lawful.
This is difficult to reconcile with the decision of Judge MacIntosh,
who said, in the Danz case, "that the fact that picketing is carried
on under some other name makes no difference as to its legal
effect." Likewise the trial courts ruling of res ad3udicata is
ignored, and the upper court holds that the limitation placed on
the activities were reasonable. The trial judge in the instant case
did not decide upon the limitations of defendants' activities, but
grounded Ins decree solely on the finding that the Danz case was
res adjudicatato this action in these words
it
And all parties hereto are hereby enjoined from
employing any threat, intimidation or violence or any
libellous, slanderous, approbrius or insulting language or
epithets against any of the other parties hereto for any
purpose whatsoever.
"The judgment of this court entered April 22, 1925
(Danz case, supra) is hereby vacated and this judgment
entered nuno pro tune as of the date of April 24, 1925.
"And the court finding that defendants at all times
consented to the re-entry of said decree (Danz case, supra)
in this cause and the court further finding that said decree is res adjudicata and determinative of this action."
It is difficult to reconcile the holding of the Supreme Court in
the instant case in light of these findings of the lower court.
By the effect of the instant case, Washington in reality has given
effect, outside of the 100 feet, to the majority view that peaceful
picketing is lawful, but within 100 feet, the minority rule that all
picketing is unlawful, is still in effect.
It is interesting to note that in a case decided December, 1929,
which has not been appealed, a restriction of 250 feet was placed
on picketing in a suburban district. 6
It is questionable what position the Supreme Court will take
when the pickets are in sight of the entrances to the places of business, and adhering to the 100-foot rule. Will the court affirm the
ruling of a trial chancellor, who upon the facts extends the 100-foot
rule, or will the court strictly adhere to the 100-foot rule 2 Such
an opportunity will be presented if the consolidated cases of the
ProgressiveTheatres Co. v. CentralLabor Council of Seattle, et al.,
1

'Royal Theatre v. Central Labor Council, et al., King County Superior

Court No. 225, 820 (1929).
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and Sterling Chain Theatres v. Central Labor Council of Seattle, et
al.,17 are appealed. But there is a strong probability that due to
the circumstances that these cases will not be appealed. Yet if
they are appealed, the issue will be squarely before the court.
These cases involving the picketing of the Winter Garden and Columbia Theatres in Seattle, were heard on show cause order July,
1929, and a restriction from 225 to 350 feet was imposed upon the
activities of the pickets. These cases were tried on the merits, May
24, 1930, and the original order was modified to distances varying
from 116.5 to 176.5 feet. The 100-foot rule was extended on the
ground that according to the language of the instant ease, the
100-foot rule was not binding upon the trial court, and that the
acts complained of would constitute intimidation if the pickets were
allowed to be within 100 feet. The court expressed the view of
prohibiting the pickets from being within sight of the theatres
entrances within the same block.
It is difficult to discern how the Supreme Court can refuse to
affirm this ruling, especially in view of the language in the instant
case, "that each case shall turn on its own circumstances." This
phrase was'borrowed by the Washington court from the Tri-City
case, supra.
The present position of the court would indicate a repudiating of
its former view that all picketing is unlawful and should not be
allowed. Without adopting the peaceful picketing clause of the
Clayton Act, which would prohibit. picketing only when it is
coercive, the court has tended in that direction. If it affirms the
ruling as suggested supra, it is in effect applying the test of intimidation in placing a limitation upon the right to picket. In applying the test of intimidation it is humanly impossible for a trial
chancellor to lay down any arbitrary rule, as such a rule must
take into consideration the different classes of the public, the
physical or mental courage or degrees of annoyance of those with
whom the plaintiff deals, and the innumerable relationships that
may exist between the public and the defendants, by affirming the
latest trial court decision, each case would turn on its own circumstances and each case would be a question of fact according to the
opinion of the trial chancellor.
CHARLES R. CAREy.

" King County Superior Court causes, Nos. 221, 183 and 221, 342.

